# The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets

## Volume I The Economics of Corruption

Edited by

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# The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets

Volume II
The Economics of Illegal Activities

Edited by

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# The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets

Volume III
The Economics of Illegal Markets and
Organized Crime

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